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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a simplified version of classical information theory to improve 
understanding of the dynamic potential of innovation systems in developing countries 
with a special focus on issues of agricultural poverty. Using examples drawn from 
emergent knowledge markets in industrialised countries, the paper suggests that such an 
analytical approach focuses attention directly on the types of institutional reforms 
necessary to improve the effectiveness of Third World agricultural R&D. Contrast is 
made with more conventional approaches that take institutional structures as given and 
focus more on factors such as price regimes, policy weaknesses and political will.  The 
paper argues that so great now are the problems in this area (particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa) that there is a clear need for institutional reform to accompany relevant 
technological changes. In the absence of such reform innovative (and hence economic) 
potential is likely to be compromised.   
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I Introduction 
 
This paper is about prospects of technological development in and for the poorest parts 
of the Third World. In an earlier paper in this volume Lipsey argues cogently that the rate 
and direction of technological change is normally quite specific to the context that 
obtains. He calls this property "context specificity" and uses it to rebut those who claim 
that technological changes occur uniformly over space and time regardless of the 
context. This paper takes up that theme with respect to a context that has tended to be 
sidelined in the standard literature dealing with innovation and technological change,1 
namely agriculture. And yet for poor developing countries it is precisely the agriculture 
sector that is so crucial. In the low-income countries, for example, recent data show that 
on average 69% of the working population continues to earn a meagre living from the 
land at an average per capita income of some $154.2 And prospects for structural 
change in economic production will also continue to depend on agriculture insofar as 
downstream processing is concerned. For this reason the discussion in what follows will 
pay particular attention to the very poorest countries. 
 
Clearly technological development is important, and yet as Horton and Elliott have 
pointed out, while “agricultural research can generate handsome returns--------
nevertheless, there is concern about the limited benefits of agricultural research for poor 
people, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where ‘Green Revolution’ technologies have 
not had a significant impact”3. This paper suggests that there may be advantage in 
approaching these and related issues from an innovation systems standpoint. More 
concretely the argument is that one important reason why agricultural innovation does 
proceed as effectively as it might is that the institutional context in which it is embedded 
often acts as inertial force. In turn an important conditioning factor is that associated 
innovation systems do not have the “connectivity” needed to link research adequately 
with economic need. 
 
Section II provides a short summarised analysis of how technological change in LDC 
agriculture has evolved over the past forty or so years. To begin with differing conditions 
compared to those in industry gave a much greater role for public funded and executed 
R&D, conducted as part of national agricultural research systems (NARS). However, 
despite the apparent successes associated with the Green Revolution the paper charts 
the growing disillusionment with the role and functioning of R&D organisations at both 
national and international levels. In particular the paper outlines a range of relatively new 
approaches that collectively attempt to empower the poor farmer as a key player in the 
innovation process. And in so doing these approaches are consistent with recent 
developments in the innovation systems literature that stress the need for greater 
"connectivity" among the component nodes of such systems. Section III takes this insight 
further by couching discussion in terms of an emergent "knowledge market". 
Traditionally national innovation systems in and for LDCs were viewed as collections of 
Science and Technology [S/T] institutions that would act as the basis for technological 
development. Their inter-relationships were hierarchical and little attention was paid to 
                                                 
1Though there is a separate literature that deals with related issues it is remarkable how little attention it 
pays to the mainstream in this sense.  
2The source for these figures is World Bank (1996), Tables 1and 4. I am grateful to Roger Sandilands for 
drawing this information to my attention. 
3See Horton and Elliott (1993), p 189. 
the precise mechanisms through which their "knowledge outputs" would go on to 
impinge on economic production. 
 
Such a view, here labelled as the "pipeline" view,4 has now given way to a position that 
stresses the need for much closer linkages between (and among) economic and 
technological agents. In the richer countries this has taken the form of innovative 
institutional arrangements that improve the efficiency of technology transfer---i.e. 
between those bodies that search for and validate knowledge on the one hand, and 
those that use such knowledge for some welfare increasing purpose on the other. 
Section IV goes on to stress that from a conceptual standpoint such institutional reforms 
are also consistent with classical informational theory in so far as this stresses the 
primacy of close links between the supplier and receiver of information if this is to be 
translated into useful knowledge. Moreover such knowledge channels are not only 
technological in the formal "technology transfer" sense but concern also marketing, 
exporting and public policy. 
 
Section V returns to the issue of technological development for agriculture in poor 
countries giving examples of new institutional initiatives that are now beginning to be 
introduced. All of these are consistent with an "innovations systems" perspective of the 
policy agenda, a perspective that does not appear, however, in much of the standard 
policy literature. Hypothetically it is argued that major obstacles to such reform are the 
associated threats to vested interests and power structures. In a development context, 
for example, a major problem is the strength of traditional views on the importance of 
hierarchy. While a dynamic national innovation system requires an increasing range of 
horizontal linkages to ensure effectiveness, political and social structures in many low-
income countries are based on the presumption of central control. The concluding 
Section VI speculates on what might be done to break and hopefully reverse this 
position. 
 
II Innovation in the Agricultural Sector 
 
There has been very little work applying the national innovation system concept to 
agriculture but there is an important sense in which implicitly it underlies recent debates. 
Perhaps the best way of approaching the point is as follows. There is sometimes an 
unconscious predisposition amongst development analysts to regard "technology" as 
relating mainly to industry and by implication almost, as having little to do with 
agriculture.  Nothing could be further from the truth. Technology, certainly in the sense 
used by economists (i.e. as the means by which resources are transformed into 
commodities that have value), is a key factor in the vitally important problems associated 
with poverty and sustainability in the Third World.  Indeed Chambers et al.(1989) [and 
referring to the estimates of Wolf(1986)]5 argue that it is the technological challenges 
associated with the poorest of farmers working on the poorest of lands that is really the 
issue of paramount importance as we come to the close of the twentieth century, if only 
because "some 1.4 billion people, or over a quarter of the human race, are dependent 
on this form of agriculture for their livelihoods, comprising approximately 1 billion in Asia, 
300 million in sub- Saharan Africa, and 100 million in Latin America"6  
 
                                                 
4See Clark (1995) for a detailed exploration of this point. 
5see Chambers, et al (1989)  
6 See op. cit. p xviii. 
But if technological factors are as important in agriculture as they are in industry, it is 
nevertheless true that they impinge in rather different ways. There are two broad 
reasons for this.  First, as Biggs and Clay (1981) noted in the early 1980s, agricultural 
production is inherently more unstable and locationally specific than is the case with 
industry.  And that in turn is because it takes place within the context of natural 
(biological) systems that continuously evolve over space and time. There is thus no 
guarantee that a technology package that "works" in a specific location in year 1 will be 
equally successful 200 metres down the road in that year, or indeed in exactly the same 
location in year 2.  Hence in terms of the production and dissemination of usable 
"knowledge", it is on the whole much more difficult to develop generic technology with 
universal applicability than is the case with industry. That is not to say that industrial 
technology is completely invariant across different contexts. There is, however, a clear 
qualitative difference compared to agriculture. 
 
The second difference relates to the failure of the market to allocate technological 
resources optimally in the case of agriculture. Unless the state intervenes there will be 
underinvestment and everyone will suffer.  Thus although the poor farmer has often a 
considerable fund of tacit knowledge about his environment he is in no position to invest 
in formal R&D to improve production possibilities.  And this is not only because of cost 
and scale factors.  It has a lot to do also with perceived risks of failure since a mistake 
can have devastating effects on the livelihood of himself and his family.  For these 
reasons, therefore, the investment of resources designed to upgrade the technological 
level of agriculture has traditionally been seen as the business of the public sector with 
research being conducted in centralised institutes and its results passed to the farmer by 
means of a network of extension agencies.  Even in rich countries with a tradition of 
capitalist agriculture, the same situation obtains--viz. an extensive network of publicly 
funded R&D institutions, financed collectively through central government revenues, 
which is seen as the correct means of improving productivity. 
 
It is this mode of technology transfer that Biggs (1989) and others have labelled as the 
"top down" or "transfer of technology" (TOT) model.7 In the immediate post-war period, 
Hall (1993) has argued, there was a widespread view that much traditional LDC 
agriculture was relatively primitive technologically speaking and that rapid population 
growth rates combined with the threat of political unrest (Anderson, 1991) meant the 
need for new technological practices. These would come from the transfer from the rich 
countries (aided by Western advisers) with diffusion taking place through community 
development programmes (Staatz & Eicher, 1984). Ruttan (1984) describes this as the 
diffusion model of agricultural development since emphasis was placed on "diffusing" 
technology directly from Western countries to LDCs. There was also the view of 
authorities like Schultz (1964) that the problem was actually not so much one of 
inefficient agronomic practices (farmers were actually quite efficient resource managers 
in Schultz' view) as one of technologies that needed to be radically upgraded to meet the 
exigencies of the post-war period. 
 
The common thread running through all this thinking, however, was the perceived need 
to transfer "best practice" to the poorest of the poor. The way this happened very often 
was through the establishment of a number of research institutions based on the US 
land grant system initially through private and bilateral aid and later with multilateral aid 
                                                 
7 See also Biggs and  Farrington (1991) 
(de Janvry and Dethier, 1985).8 Bell (1979) is amongst those who have subsequently 
argued that although this (land grant) system may have worked well in the context of its 
inception in the US in the late 19th century, in Third World circumstances a hundred 
years later it has been found wanting. But, in the context of the time the TOT model was 
very much to the fore as the correct institutional mode for agricultural development.  
Furthermore, for the first time, plant breeders applied to crops grown in tropical countries 
two principles previously confined to temperate food crops---viz. hybrid vigour and 
dwarfing (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989). First came the maize hybrids of the 1950s with 
their origins in the US, but spreading to Central America and East Africa. Next, starting in 
the late 50s and early 60s, came the short-strawed, fertiliser-responsive varieties; rice in 
East Asia (Anderson, 1991), and wheat in Northern Mexico and the Punjab region of 
India and Pakistan.  It was these so-called "high yielding varieties or HYVs" that became 
the bedrock of what is now known as the Green Revolution (GR), holding out the 
promise of solving at a stroke the world's food problems. 
 
However, the initial impetus for the GR did not come from the national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) of the LDCs themselves, but from two international research 
centres that subsequently became the model for the sixteen or so centres that now 
comprise the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system 
---CIMMYT in Mexico for wheat and maize, and IRRI in the Philippines for rice.  The 
CGIAR system (sometimes called the CG system) came into being (in 1971) because 
despite international help for the NARS, many LDC governments did not support local 
research sufficiently.  In compensation, therefore, multilateral and bilateral aid, along 
with support from private foundations, was channelled to international centres of 
excellence that would undertake strategic research for LDCs without becoming 
enmeshed in the administrative and political arenas of client countries. What emerged 
was a two-tiered system. The CG centres developed production technologies and 
varieties for mandated crops (and geographical regions) that were subsequently passed 
on to the NARS for applied, contextual research and final transfer to the farmers. This 
essentially is the TOT model which became the "engine" of the Green Revolution and 
which has really dominated policy thinking until very recently.  Its chief characteristics 
are a belief in the existence of scale economies in the R&D process, a faith in the 
scientific method as the main source of improved technological practices for the poorest 
of the poor and relatively little attention paid to the tacit knowledge and local preferences 
of the farmers themselves (Chambers & Ghildyal, 1985).9 
 
But how well has the system worked? While in earlier periods it is clear that big 
productivity gains were achieved, particularly with respect to maize, wheat and rice, as 
time has gone by the evidence has become much patchier. At national level, for 
example, many NARS are clearly not performing well and this is so for a number of 
reasons.10 Firstly, the NARS have often tended to become isolated from economic 
production, with research scientists seeing their role and function in professional rather 
than production terms. Research projects are often pursued as much for scientific 
                                                 
8 see p16 
9 See pp 1-30. 
10 It is hard to single out a full set of references for these points. However, interested readers are referred to 
the following sources: Horton and Elliot (Eds., 1993), Biggs (1989), Hall and Clark (1995). For a rather 
different view see Evenson et al. (1999). However, the conclusions of the authors are based upon data 
relating to the period 1977-87 and therefore are not inconsistent with my own view. 
interest (and because of the publishability of results) as for relevance to the needs of the 
poor farmer. Second, within research bodies there are difficulties in establishing 
organisational structures that can focus on the broad (interdisciplinary) problems faced 
by the farmer. Third, this then becomes reflected in funding patterns since resources get 
allocated according to scientific criteria by funding bodies advised by professional 
scientists whose criteria of excellence are "scientific" rather than developmental. Fourth, 
many NARS are under-funded because of macroeconomic constraints. This is especially 
the case in the poorer countries such as those in Sub-Saharan agriculture11. Fifth, 
publicly financed extension systems have difficulty coping with the demands made on 
them for a variety of reasons. These range from shortages of adequately trained human 
resources to the sheer operational difficulties of organising and managing the 
complexities of new technological packages in such a way that they can reach a 
receptive audience of a reasonable proportion of the relevant farm population. Indeed 
there are a number of commentators (such as Chambers for example), who argue that 
as an organisational form the traditional extension system is inherently unviable and will 
eventually have to be replaced with something better, though there is a lot of uncertainty 
as to exactly what this should be. 
 
Nor have things gone well at international levels. One problem with the CG centres is 
that they operate as a hierarchy. The ultimate paymasters are the donors, both bilateral 
and multilateral, each of which has its own aid agenda12. The centres are then charged 
with research designed to produce generic knowledge, which is supposed to be 
contextualised by the national agricultural research systems (the NARS) of individual 
countries. Finally the NARS pass applied knowledge through extension agencies and 
other service departments to the ultimate beneficiary--the small semi-subsistence 
farmer. The difficulties of this set-up are by now well known.  There is no readily 
available means for farmer problems to communicate directly with the centres, which 
tend on the other hand to be driven by values of traditional scientific research. In many 
countries the NARS are weak and so cannot build the necessary bridges with the 
farmers, while the practice of employing socio-economic expertise to orient strategic 
research in a more direct fashion is by no means as widespread as might be expected. 
 
It is for reasons such as these that while the CGIAR system has cost considerable 
resources in terms of international aid it is not easy to estimate resultant benefits.  In a 
detailed early survey, for example, Horton (1986) argued that for a variety of reasons it is 
virtually impossible to calculate a meaningful rate of return to investment in the CG 
funded research.  The "unique contribution of international programmes to agricultural 
development is to supply R&D technology which improves institutional performance, 
rather than production technology which raises productivity at the farm level.  
International programs play a strategic role in disseminating research findings, 
methodologies and institutional strategies (for the NARS--- but) the impact of (such 
programs) should be assessed primarily in institutional terms, not in terms of production 
increases at the farm level"13. More recently Reece (1998), in the context of a detailed 
                                                 
11 See for example, Tripp (1993) 
12 The CGIAR system is suffering financial constraints to an unprecedented degree and not unrelatedly has 
been subject itself to a series of reviews in recent years that have been designed to facilitate appropriate re-
adjustments. 
13 Horton (1986) p 465. The more general problem of the CGIAR's organisational structure has been 
partially addressed in the report of a recent review panel. See Ozgediz (1993)  
historical case study of the Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropica (CIAT), has 
argued that while the CG centres were successful in achieving their original aggregate 
productivity goals for well defined products, such as wheat and rice, they have become 
singularly unsuccessful when attempting to deal with “poorly defined problems”14. By 
these he means problems like the degradation of a natural resource base and the 
inadequate livelihoods provided by low-resource agriculture. The issue is really while 
well-defined goals are amenable to a “pipeline” research methodology, most modern 
issues for poor farmers need a more systemic approach. Here he echoes commentators 
like Eponou (1993) who develops the case for a “systems perspective” arguing that even 
the so-called Farming Systems Research Model “has not been very effective in testing 
and adapting technologies for resource poor farmers”.15 
 
III National Systems of Innovation 
 
How might a national innovation systems perspective inform this discussion? One 
reason for the popularity of what Biggs (1990) has called the TOT model is that it fitted 
very well into established views about the proper conduct of science. And since 
agricultural innovation has close links with scientific research this is a useful analytic 
starting point. A traditional way often used in setting out the general conceptual issues is 
to think in terms of a division of labour between "knowledge search" and "knowledge 
use". University departments and state funded research institutes carry out pure 
research according to canons of objectivity determined by the cognitive authority of peer 
review. The knowledge that results from this activity is then drawn upon as and when 
needed by a productive sector which has quite a different agenda, that of making money 
from the sale of goods and services. Whether it refers to the natural or the social 
sciences makes no real difference. The market will draw upon the technological 
resources it needs as and when necessary. Knowledge impinges on economic 
production at the end of a pipeline, which in turn represents a cognitive hierarchy of 
excellence. One of the great advantages of such a view is that it provides legitimacy for 
professional interest groups. For example economists can treat technology as 
exogenous to their analysis of any process, and concentrate upon explaining the 
"results" of technology in purely economic terms.  Similarly physical scientists can justify 
their research in terms of the disciplinary authority of their peers, unsullied by 
commercial and other worldly pressures. 
 
As industrialisation proceeded in the post-war years, however, it became increasingly 
difficult to see innovation in such stark terms. The shortage of governmental capacity to 
continue to fund pure research, disciplinary rigidities within academic and quasi-
academic bodies, changing technological demands in the productive sector and 
expansion of activity within the knowledge-producing sector itself, each contributed to 
the blurring of the boundaries that demarcated these traditional knowledge categories. 
To begin with the notion of state funding of applied science began to break down 
because countries could not afford to continue to support the apparently ever-increasing 
demands of science in the face of severe economic constraints. In Britain, for example, 
the recommendations of the Rothschild Report (Rothschild, 1971) in the early 1970s 
represented probably the first real attempt to introduce market criteria into science 
funding---in this case by suggesting the notion of a "customer-contractor" principle as a 
means of determining the research needs of government departments. They included 
                                                 
14See Chapter 6, p 225. 
15See op. cit. p 309. 
also however, changes to traditional patterns of resource allocation within the research 
council system---in this case by alienating a proportion of funding, held to be "applied", 
to the relevant department.  Essentially the Rothschild reforms were an attempt to 
separate off the funding of "basic" research from that having practical uses and in this 
way to introduce some kind of economic discipline into what was rapidly becoming an 
expensive drain on national resources.  
 
From that point on in the UK (and similar trends have obtained in other countries) a 
range of new institutional forms have emerged to improve the efficiency of this emergent 
knowledge market. Examples include the increased use of directorates, such as the UK 
Biotechnology Directorate, designed to focus the combined strengths of industry, 
research, university and government on a key generic technology: interdisciplinary 
research programmes; and schemes like the UK "teaching company" scheme that 
introduce joint academic/industry PhD supervision of students that are also employees of 
companies. The net effect of all these initiatives has been to blur the distinction between 
knowledge search and knowledge use and hence to make the notion of a knowledge 
pipeline (or shelf) increasingly untenable. Instead attention is now placed on more 
complex ideas like that of the national innovation system. Defined as the "network of 
economic agents together with the institutions and policies that influence their innovative 
behaviour and performance",16 emphasis is placed on how such a system should be 
organised to improve the dynamics of economic production. 
 
Here the key factor is the need to understand much better than we do at present why 
innovation and technical change can be so influential in economic development in some 
countries but so much less so in others. Modern literature emphasis factors such as the 
increasing knowledge base of economic production, the tacitness of much of this 
knowledge (i.e. the importance of non-codified knowledge), the role of "learning 
interactions" amongst different techno-economic agents and associated networking 
arrangements, the non-linear properties of relevant knowledge flows, the significance of 
user/supplier contact, specially designed public policy regimes, and other factors which 
do not in and of themselves relate directly to components of the science/technology 
(S/T) system as conventionally defined.  
 
It was largely to take account of these dynamic properties that the idea of a national 
innovation system was given its “systemic” title although unfortunately very little of the 
national system of innovation literature engages directly with the concept of a "system" 
independently of its use. Instead the word "system" is employed as a kind of loose 
metaphor to describe broad relationships among relevant stakeholders whose activities 
affect innovation. Very probably this tends to weaken related policy analysis simply 
because it is hard for the analyst to use the underlying ideas in a rigorous way. And all 
too often, we find, there is a tendency for policy analysis to retreat back to the single 
discipline with the inevitable result that such analysis often fails to capture the holistic 
nature of problems and solutions.17  For analytical purposes, therefore, it is useful to 
                                                 
16 See Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (1999) for detailed discussion of this concept. There is actually a 
burgeoning literature on the topic but these two sources provide a comprehensive review. 
17 There is in fact a substantial literature on systems analysis dating back fifty years and more. For example, 
Lotka and von Bertalanffy began to develop an open systems perspective on all science in the 1920s and 
1930s, while more recently Emery, Beer, Ashby and many others have done a great deal of valuable work 
in applying systemic ideas to a wide range of disciplines. For a useful collection of some of the classic 
papers in this tradition see Emery (1970) that includes a paper by von Bertalanffy referencing some of his 
begin with a broad description of what precisely is the nature of such a system, what 
does it consist of, how may it be identified, how may it be classified, how does it behave, 
and so forth? 
 
A system may be defined as something that is made up of interconnected elements (or 
nodes), and has a boundary that separates the inside from the environment. Often a 
distinction is drawn between a closed system and an open system, based upon the 
extent to which the analyst wishes to consider the degree of interaction with the system’s 
environment. When the system is open, both matter and energy can enter and leave the 
system. When the system is closed, in general energy, but not matter, can cross its 
boundary. Sometimes a distinction is also made between an isolated and a closed 
system such that in the former case neither matter nor energy can cross its boundary. In 
the human or life sciences, however, in addition to these broad distinctions (which often 
actually help to define a system in the physical sciences as a closed one), we have three 
additional requirements. Firstly, the interacting elements, which make up living systems, 
are connected in an organised manner.  Secondly, the participating components are 
affected by their participation, and are modified when they leave the system.  Thirdly, the 
system as a whole behaves.  It does something while turning its inputs into outputs, or 
depending on the point of view, it may do something in order to turn its inputs into 
outputs. 
 
Central to the notion of a national system of innovation is therefore the degree of 
substantive interconnection among the "nodes" of that system. This paper argues that 
this interconnectedness is both informational and institutional. What do I mean by this? 
Basically the idea is that as society becomes more technologically sophisticated its 
component organs generate increasing volumes of information. And it is how to cope 
with this that becomes the key question. In other words, there is so much information 
(potential knowledge) in most economic systems that the scarce resource is how to 
identify what is relevant to any specific activity and organise it in a productive way. In 
turn this requires system-wide skills [including the capacity to achieve interaction 
between agents] that have also to be created. 
     
In this way the concept of a national innovation system is now used as a kind of 
shorthand for the network of inter-institutional linkages that apparently successful 
countries have built up as a support system for economic production across the board. In 
this sense it has been explicitly recognised that economic creativity is actually about the 
quality of "technology linkages" and "knowledge flows" amongst and between economic 
agents. Where the interactions are dynamic and progressive great innovative strides are 
often made. Conversely where systemic components are compartmentalised and 
isolated from each other, the result is often that relevant research bodies are not at all 
productive. In extreme cases they have ceased to provide any innovative output at all. 
Put another way the key property of a national system of innovation is therefore not so 
much its component parts, or nodes, but rather how it performs as a dynamic whole. As 
one recent paper argues: "Even if single elements of such systems are strong, the 
system as a whole may be weak. The capability to learn and build new competencies will 
depend on how well the parts fit together and on the strength of these connections."18 It 
also adds four other key properties of successful national system of innovation, viz.:  
                                                                                                                                                 
own early ones. For a more complete discussion of the general issue see also Clark, Allen and Perez-Trejo 
(1995), especially Chapters  1 & 2. 
18 See UNCTAD (1996), pp 5 & 6. See also Mytelka and Tesfachew (1998). 
 
• The implications of this perspective for public policy (e.g. it has begun to be used as 
an explicit policy tool, such as in "foresight" exercises) 
 
• The need to focus on entrepreneurship in its broadest sense 
 
• The importance of organisational/institutional innovations as an integral part a 
dynamic national system of innovation 
 
• The need to integrate the national system of innovation with foreign knowledge 
sources 
 
IV Information Theory 
 
In order to shed more light on the topic it is useful to make a distinction between 
‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. In fact conventional economic analysis does not do this 
but on the whole uses both concepts interchangeably to describe a category of boundary 
conditions that prevent economic actors from behaving, as they ought to (to achieve 
some putative optimum in terms of the allocation of resources).19 What the formal theory 
of information does is to define the concept in a way that is logically independent of 
‘meaning’ and in so doing provides the basis for a more general theory of systemic 
communication. In particular, it allows us to relate the flow of information to that of 
energy/entropy and thence to develop a model of the technical change process that has 
the property of systemic generality20. Information theory conceptualises ‘information’ in 
terms of a flow of ‘messages’ that have ‘news value’; that is, they cause surprise to 
recipients. In the words of Singh (1966) for the ‘communications engineer’s purification 
of the term, the stress is on the quantitative aspects of the flow in a network of an 
intangible attribute called information’.21  Such a network consists of three main parts: 
 
• a transmitter; 
• a receiver; 
• a communications channel 
 
Figure 1  
  
 
 
 
Since the medium of communication is not in general similar to that of the transmitter or 
receiver, there needs to be a means of translating signals at the beginning and at the 
end of the process, so that any typical communication system may be represented as 
shown in Figure 1. For example, a traditional radio system operates by converting 
sequences of voice production into electromagnetic waves that are beamed through the 
atmosphere to be received and understood by listeners. Thus ‘information’ turns out to 
be closely related to energy. Its flows are conventionally quantified in statistical terms, 
                                                 
19 There is a long history of the conflation of information with knowledge going back to Machlup in the 
1950s at least. See Machlup (1962). 
20 For a detailed discussion of this point see Clark and Juma (1992) 
21 See op cit. p 9. 
Encoder Channel Decoder Receiver Information 
that is by means of a multiplicand of probabilities attached to ‘bits’ of information where 
the total information content of any message, in a given ‘ensemble’ of possible 
messages, may be measured by the logarithm of the probability of its occurrence. 
Logarithms are used to convert combination of discrete probability measures to a 
summation.  Hence the information content in any complex of messages is then simply 
the sum of its individual components.   
 
Singh (1966) shows that no information system has this freedom of information content 
because of practical limitations. The English language, for example, is such that not all of 
its letters are equally likely to be chosen. It has the property of ‘redundancy’ and it is this 
redundancy that gives it ‘intelligibility’.  It may easily be seen also that redundancy is 
closely related to organisation. This is because as soon as constraints are placed on a 
system (in this example, to give language intelligibility), to that extent the system exhibits 
a degree of organisation that it would not have had in the absence of such constraints. 
Notice, finally however, that the above definition is completely independent of semantic 
meaning.  It is merely ‘a measure of one’s freedom of choice when one selects a 
message from the available set, many of which may well be devoid of meaning’. It is thus 
used logically in computer science.22 Thus the greater the amount of raw information in 
any given system the more chaotic that system will become and the greater the need for 
internal organisation to give its component parts meaning. It is in this very fundamental 
sense that organisation is so central to the idea of an innovation system. Unless the 
institutional context is such that information flows have meaning to the separate nodes of 
that system, it will not function as a dynamical system and will not in consequence 
contribute significantly to economic growth and development. 
 
Two properties immediately follow from this discussion. The first is that information only 
becomes useful knowledge if the receiver perceives it to be so. In a sense the receiver, 
whether an individual or an organisation, needs to understand information as 
economically productive. To the extent that understanding is not there, then the 
information loses value. From an organisational standpoint the capacity to convert 
information into useful knowledge, and thence technical change, is therefore contingent 
on internal organisational conditions. Put differently, unlike economic commodity flows, 
information flows only take on value where there is a deep and shared understanding of 
what that information means on the part of both the sender and the recipient.23 And it is 
this peculiar property that renders the market for knowledge so hard to function 
efficiently. For example, it is one important reason why centralised public sector 
laboratories often find it hard to interest the private sector in their research findings. The 
second property is that productive information flows are also therefore a function of 
related actions on the part of recipients. This is because the capacity to understand the 
full potential of externally acquired knowledge is governed to a large degree by recipient 
                                                 
22 It has the additional property of being similar to an energetic measure, because since this measure of 
information is statistical it is therefore directly analogous to the statistical mechanics of molecular systems. 
Here the degree of freedom of any closed system (its entropy), or its thermodynamic probability, is a 
measure of the deviation of molecular (or micro) ‘states’ from the average (or macro) ‘state’ of the whole 
system. See op. cit. p 9. 
23There is of course an informational content in any normal economic transaction but outside the case of 
very complex goods we can probably treat this as fairly trivial. For those who cannot accept such treatment, 
a more general position could be to define pure "economic" transactions as having no informational 
uncertainty but where they do, to stress the contingent nature of such transactions in a purely informational 
sense.  
knowledge investment. Paradoxically technology transfer in general only works well 
where the recipient carries out its own related R&D programme. 
  
Nor are these relationships only technical but are also ideological since in a fundamental 
sense, organisations only hear what they want to hear.24 For example, contemporary 
philosophy of science now accepts that that all knowledge is contingent knowledge in the 
sense that it its results are theory dependent. The idea of the "paradigm" popularised by 
Toulmin, Kuhn, Lakatos and others in the 1960s25 was originally developed to show how 
scientific progress is strongly influenced by institutional views about the true underlying 
nature of reality. And it was not long before Constant, Aitken, Hughes, Rosenberg, Dosi 
and many others extended this argument to technological progress.26 Here the idea of 
the "technological paradigm" was used to an established technology that guides 
production.27 The "paradigm" was defined as a set of shared views among the 
stakeholders about the correct knowledge base for production. In effect it supplies the 
informational coherence that provides for the knowledge market what the product itself 
provides for the product market. And in the absence of such shared informational 
coherence, it would really be impossible for production to take place at all. Notice also 
that the paradigm crosses established institutional boundaries. No longer is it justifiable 
to argue that "basic science" should somehow proceed in the absence of any 
consideration of the needs and aspirations of development or economic production. 
Nowadays the science-based nature of much economic production renders this 
inadvisable from a policy standpoint. 
 
There is one additional point that should be stressed about this analysis of information 
theory. That is it illustrates by implication the need for well-organised and co-operative 
knowledge markets. Nowadays (and partly also because of technological changes in 
information handling) there is so much information that could be relevant to economic 
agents that new ways have to be found of minimising the costs of information search and 
maximising the “receptivity” of those who are able to use the information. It is this 
essentially interactive feature that ultimately lies behind the notion of an innovation 
system and distinguishes an effective one from an ineffective one. A system which 
permits information interchange among otherwise independent organisations, where 
management hierarchies do not intrude excessively and where encouragement is 
provided to individual agents to try out new and possibly risky approaches (and even to 
make mistakes), stands every chance of contributing greatly to innovation and change.  
 
Conversely, a system that is formal and rule-bound, where individual agents are 
constrained by their own hierarchies and where co-operation between organisations is 
viewed with resentment and suspicion, is unlikely to make that sort of positive socio-
economic impact. It is with this disjunction in mind that many industrialised countries, 
driven to some extent also by the recent success of Japan and the East Asian NICs, 
                                                 
24 As Duysters (1996) has pointed out in a recent detailed study of major IT sectors, even if a firm fully 
appreciates the necessity for a specific course of action in a techno-economic sense, attempts to put this 
into practice may fail if significant organisational stakeholders simply cannot bring themselves to believe in 
it. And though this is sometimes related to threatened vested interests, often it is simply that the measure 
contradicts some deeply (and widely) held belief system. 
25 See, for example, Lakatos I & A Musgrave (Eds.) (1972). These points are discussed in detail in Clark & 
Juma (1992). 
26 Probably the first to do this in a substantive way, to my knowledge, was Constant. See Constant (1980). 
See also Clark (1987) and Clark and Juma (1992) Chapters 4 & 5. 
27 See Clark (1987) 
have begun to experiment with new and innovative institutional forms of the emergent 
knowledge market. Notice finally that such knowledge channels are not simply those 
associated directly with the transfer of a given technology per se. A recent UNCTAD 
document maintains that what is equally needed are channels of communication that 
build awareness of alternative technology sources, public policy regimes that can help or 
hinder transfer processes and incentive structures that permit co-operative 
arrangements among organisations that currently treat each other as rivals rather than 
as potential sources of new knowledge28. 
 
V Prospects for the Future 
 
How then does this type of analysis relate to the LDC agricultural context? We saw from 
the earlier discussion in Section II that a major issue in agricultural R&D is the top-down 
nature of the institutional context in which it tends to occur. Because so much of 
research is conducted within the public sector29 the prevailing trend has always been 
one in which the rules and norms of professional science have governed events. And 
inevitably as Biggs and many others have pointed out, "pipeline" thinking has applied. 
And even where strenuous efforts are made to develop closer linkages (with user 
sectors, for example) such is the inertia of prevailing institutional forms that it is actually 
quite hard to get these changes to work. 
 
This is not to say that changes are not beginning to happen. For example, Ethiopia has 
radically transformed its agricultural extension system over the past five years following 
a period under the Derg during which agriculture as a whole stagnated dramatically.30 In 
fact there was practically no extension to speak of in the period 1974-1983. In 1983 the 
then Government introduced a food self-sufficiency programme based on the Training 
and Visit [T&V] type of extension system, but this also met with limited success. 
Accordingly upon the advent of the new regime the Government instituted a new 
philosophy based on farmer participation. This was prompted by the "Sasakawa Global 
2000" initiative31 although initially there was little response on the part of the farmers. 
There followed the Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension scheme 
[PADETES]. Starting in that year with 167 farmers, by 1994 there were 1600 farmers 
reached. In 1995 a national programme had got underway (35,000) and livestock forage 
had been introduced. By 1996 the scheme had reached around 360,000 farmers and dry 
land zones were included. By 1997 a range of new packages had been developed and 
some 650,000 farmers had been reached. In 1998 the authorities estimate a figure of 2.5 
million. 
 
Essentially the new system is oriented mainly towards assessing farmer need and hence 
advising on R&D priorities, but with a strong participatory and human resource 
development dimension. For example in one regional research centre near Lake Tana 
there is a dedicated Research & Extension section mainly concerned with fulfilling the 
PADETES strategy of setting up on-farm demonstrations. In addition the agricultural 
economics section has as its primary role, advising on priorities on the basis of 
                                                 
28See UNCTAD (1999). 
29According to Eyzaguirre and Okello (1993) who conducted a detailed survey of NARS in 50 of the 
poorest countries public research bodies employ over 90% of the total. See page 239. 
30 See UNCTAD (2000), Chapter 4. 
31Discussed in Tripp (1993) 
assessing farmer need.32 The chosen farmer supplies only labour for cultivation of the 
demonstration plot and is allowed to keep the proceeds, which often amount to a yield 
50% greater than normal. Advertising is done by extension workers who announce the 
existence of the trials and periodic field days that are well attended. According to the 
general manager of the research centre the results have been very successful with 
significant rates of adoption of the recommended technologies.33 
 
Another general area where significant developments appear to be taking place is in 
contract farming. By this is meant the practice of a central node establishing purchase 
contracts with farmers. These usually involve the central node supplying the technology, 
markets and credits for inputs such as fertiliser. The farmer supplies land, labour and 
tools in growing the crop, which is then sent to the central node for finishing, grading, 
packaging and sale, often to an export market.  Although such schemes are not without 
their problems (see, for example, Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997) they are an 
increasingly important mechanism for technological development in many parts of the 
Third World. The central node is often a multinational company. An example here is the 
firm Arbor International that sources fresh food from countries like Zimbabwe and then 
supplies to big retailing firms such as Marks and Spencer. In this case the intermediary 
provides technology, other key information, cold storage and airfreight facilities, and 
direct access to a high value market.34 
 
In other cases the node is a parastatal company like the Magwa Tea Corporation in the 
Transkei (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997), or a co-operative like the Vijaya Vegetable 
and Fruit Growers Association in India (Hall et al, 1998). The latter purchases grapes 
and mangoes from small Indian farmers and sells to centralised markets in big Indian 
cities, the Middle East and Europe. Paradoxically in this case one of the problems faced 
is access to necessary technological inputs. Public sector bodies seem unable to deal 
with the systemic nature of the technological changes needed to penetrate successfully 
these high value markets. And according to Hall et al. (1998) this is at least partially due 
to the “pipeline” attitudes of research centre staff. Their research shows that the central 
node was forced to access technology from another private sector firm and a research 
facility in Europe. 
 
Yet another institutional development is the potential role of growers associations in 
providing greater coherence to NARS in a Third World context. A good example here 
can be found in the recent UNCTAD (1999) science and technology review of Colombia, 
with cases drawn from three sectors—Cut Flowers, Coffee and Sugar. In each sector the 
growers association (or gremio) provides a range of technological services at a level of 
quality that the corresponding public sector institutions seem incapable of matching. 
Indeed in some cases the gremios undertake investment functions (such as road 
building/repair) that are normally the preserve of the state. Porter and Phillips-Howard 
(1993) also recommend the establishment and/or improvements of growers associations 
as a mechanism to improve some of the problematic side effects of contract farming 
schemes. 
                                                 
32This contrasts with arguably the more commonly observed practice whereby agricultural economists 
spend the bulk of their time researching for publishable material. 
33 The "Sasakawa Global 2000" initiative, however, is not a straightforward panacea. See Tripp (1993) for 
an interesting evaluation of its impact on maize production in Ghana. 
34See UNCTAD (2000), Chapter 1. 
 
A final type of development that is increasingly common in many parts of the Third World 
is the use of NGOs to supplement public sector R&D activity. In a recent survey of 
agricultural R&D relevant to the small farmer in Latin America, for example, Kaimowitz 
(1993) shows how much of the green revolution success of the 1950-80 period has 
either by-passed the small farmer or has created new problems for him that the public 
research sector seems unable to deal with. Again (though the author does not use this 
terminology) at least some of the reason for this is the “pipeline” nature of institutional 
structures. Kaimowitz goes on to argue that much greater use should be made of NGOs 
to contextualise public sector R&D and to provide the necessary connections to the real 
problems (and knowledge) of the poor farmer.  
 
What all these developments have in common is that they are examples of a more 
systemic approach to technological development in and for Third World agriculture. They 
also add substantially to a debate that has tended really to avoid many of the important 
institutional questions. Thus we still see many examples of analysis that while 
pessimistic about the level of resource allocation to agricultural research, do not directly 
engage with these systemic institutional issues. Good examples of this can be found in 
Lipton (1988) and Pardey et al (1997). In the latter the authors provide a detailed 
account of the decline in African agricultural research spending but there is virtually no 
analysis of why this has happened. Consequently the final conclusion focusing on the 
need to increase finance is unconvincing. The Lipton paper goes further in linking 
declining research expenditures to falling economic rates of return but the analysis 
virtually ignores institutional questions, concentrating instead on poor policy frameworks, 
below optimum size of research stations and product relevance. 
 
Tripp (1993) seems to get much closer to the institutional issues in his penetrating 
analysis of Ghanaian maize research. His position is that international support for public 
research in agriculture has certainly declined significantly and this is strongly connected 
to the “disappointing track record of many government agricultural research 
organisations”35. But the remedies suggested reflect too simplistic an analysis that often 
results in premature abandonment of public sector R&D. 
 
“Rather than trying to carefully define a role for public sector 
research, donors and governments have shifted to an uncritical 
reliance on alternatives. The two principal candidates are the 
private sector and the NGO community, both of which clearly 
offer important contributions. Few would dispute that public 
sector agricultural research deserves a housecleaning, but there 
is a real danger that both external donors and national 
governments will use the new alternatives as an excuse to 
abandon rather than to reshape the public sector contribution to 
agricultural development”36 
 
The paper goes on to analyse a number of the suggested “alternatives” concluding that 
none of them are by themselves sufficient to remedy the situation and that a re-vitalised 
                                                 
35See Tripp (1993) p 2003. 
36 Ibid. pp 2003-2004. 
public R&D sector has an important part to play. Although he does not put it in so many 
words, it is clear that Tripp is implicitly arguing for a more systemic approach to the 
analysis of agricultural research, an approach that has the potential to integrate the 
different contributions that a wide range of actors can make.  
 
VI Conclusions 
 
The nub of this paper has been to stress the essential complementarity between 
institutional and technological changes, at least in the context of Third World agriculture. 
While there is no question that public sector R&D is an essential component of an 
effective NARS, it is also clear that its activities need to be supplemented by other 
mechanisms designed to ensure productivity improvements, especially for the poor 
farmer. The decline in formal public sector R&D investment noticed by many 
commentators over the past twenty years may well be due to these complementary 
shortfalls rather than problems with the R&D as such. But from an innovations system 
standpoint the diagnosis appears self-evident, viz. the necessary linkages to ensure 
healthy technological development often do not exist and have therefore to be fostered. 
Not that this is easy to bring about since in many poor countries top-down power 
structures are common. In Africa, for example, Juma and Clark (1995) point out that 
many institutions were copied from ex-colonial powers at the time of independence but 
then cloned to social structures that favoured traditionally hierarchical systems of 
administration. The result has been that attempts to create the kinds of "horizontal" 
connectivity necessary for healthy innovation systems are often resisted for cultural 
reasons or because of perceived loss of control on the part of vested interests. Tribal 
ethnocentricity then exaggerates an already unproductive situation. Under these 
conditions the resultant haemorrhaging of NARS throughout much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa has inevitably been hard to remedy. 
 
And yet there are indications that institutional change is certainly possibly. For example, 
CGIAR centres have begun increasingly to associate their work with private sector 
bodies, illustrated by recent developments in India. Thus Pray and Kelley (1997) report 
the way breeding lines from the International Agricultural Research Centres have been 
used by the private sector seed industry in India (specifically maize lines from CIMMYT 
in Mexico, and sorghum, pearl millet and pigeon pea lines from ICRISAT).  More recently 
a consortium of  five Indian seed sector companies has contracted ICRISAT to develop 
a bold grained sorghum genotype over the next five years. The findings of Pray and 
Kelley (1997)37 suggest that in the Indian seed industry, R&D managers feel that India’s 
seed industry would benefit by innovative experiments in research funding as well as 
contractual agreements and partnerships involving private and public institutions.  While 
the private sector is expressing a strong desire, however, progress so far is limited.     
Section V of this paper has given other examples of the types of institutional innovation 
that show considerable promise in this regard. If allowed space to develop and with the 
help of supportive administrations, they could begin to transform possibilities for poverty 
reduction in precisely those parts of the Third World that appear to most in need. Indeed 
far from being a threat, such institutional reforms could end up by giving much greater 
legitimacy to political leaderships who could then claim, with some justification, that their 
wise interventions had been a necessary ingredient. The basic point, however, is that 
the lack of technological development in Third World agriculture is not something 
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reducible to simple solutions such as lack of finance. Nor is it due solely to lack of 
research skills since much more could be made of existing capacities. What are really 
needed are institutional structures that permit the symbiosis of knowledge search with 
knowledge use. Only when that is successfully achieved will the problem begin to 
reduce. 
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